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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
 SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B  
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
 DATE 2007

No. 1 of 4  
 #30884

## COVER SHEET

EE-10  
 18-10

OUTLINE PLAN FOR PROJECT NO. 18-10Code Name BGFIEND

Developed by:

Plan

er

13 June 1949  
 Date

Operations Offi-

Coordinated by:

(X)

CPP

20 June 1949  
 DATE

\*\*

COP

20 June 1949  
 Date

COS

20 June 1949  
 Date

Budgeted by:

MBO

21 June 1949  
 Date

DOWN GRADE PER  
 IFICATION REVIEW DIVISION

Authorized by

ADPC

22 June 1949  
 Date

(X)

Subject to following additions:

1. Explicit statement of US-UK collaboration
2. Consideration of appropriate OPC action in event of stated adverse contingencies

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If not already done, strongly suggest DCI be cut in on this project.

\* I am now subject to understanding that project will be submitted to other account of certain points which I shall make by special memo.

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AB 30884

PROJECT OUTLINE

Project "BGFRIEND" No. \_\_\_\_\_

Type Operational

1. References

✓ a. NSC 10/2 *see* DPC POLICY PAPER

b. Plan for Albania, undated (TS No. 30644), approved by ADPC and the Department of State. DATED 3 MAY 49  
*IN BGFRIEND FILE 1.3*

c. Outline for Operational Plan for Albania, approved 23 May 1949 by ADPC. *IN BGFRIEND FILE 1.3*

d. Conversations of 20 to 26 May 1949 between ADPC and Staff and Department of State, British Foreign Office, and SOE representatives. ONLY AVAILABLE COPY  
*IN REGISTRY*

e. Memorandum of 21 March 1949 to [ ]  
from [ ] *IN BGFRIEND FILE 1.3* ]

2. Project Proposal

a. (1) Ultimate Objective

The ultimate objective of this project is the overthrow of the present Soviet-dominated government in Albania thereby facilitating the establishment of a government which is responsive to and supported by the people of Albania and therefore one whose aims and objectives will not be inimical to those of the United States in that area.

(2) Preliminary Objectives

(a) Covert establishment and support of an "Albanian National Committee" composed of representatives of the various emigre groups.

(b) Organization and training of refugee Albanian patriots outside Albania to be accomplished by the "Committee" with covert supervision and support.

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- ✓ (c) Organization and training of friendly patriots and sympathizers within Albania to be accomplished by Committee trained agents with covert guidance, supervision, and support.
- ✓ (d) Creation of a provisional government group by the Committee with covert guidance, which will function after the Coup d'etat until elections can be held.

(3) Corollary Objectives

- (a) Elimination of conditions which now make necessary large U.S. expenditures in Greece. (Ref. d and e above)
- (b) Elimination of the Soviet outpost on the Adriatic.
- (c) Alteration of the present political and strategic balance in the Balkans which will lend encouragement to resistance groups in the satellite countries and promote uneasiness in their governments thus encouraging disruption of Soviet control.

b. Discussion

The means to be employed in the accomplishment of the objectives enumerated above are all subject to the restriction that United States participation shall not be provable before an international body. Generally speaking, the entire operation will be carried on by the Albanian groups under the direction of the Committee. The success of the project will be conditioned materially by the attitudes of the governments of Yugoslavia and Greece. Although the complexity and ramified nature of this project renders only a general outline feasible at this time, it is contemplated that four principle phases will be involved in the successful consummation of the project.

- (1) A political phase involving the formation, location, support and guidance of an Albanian National Committee under United States control.

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- (2) A propaganda phase in the course of which all manner of overt, semi-overt and covert means will be employed in the name of the Albanian National Committee to create conditions favorable to a coup d'etat.
- (3) An organization and training phase involving intensive reconnaissance, formulation of operational plans for the coup d'etat and, in the latter stages, execution of limited operations. Suitable safeguards and precautions will be imposed to assure our control of the movement in Albania in the transition from this to the succeeding phase.
- (4) A coup d'etat to be undertaken when and only if external conditions affecting Albania and internal conditions in that country are propitious, as determined by proper United States authorities. Among the preconditions for this action are:
  - (a) Adequate strength on the ground.
  - (b) The Greek Army has closed on the Southern Albanian frontier.
  - (c) Albania continues physically isolated from the Soviet Empire.
  - (d) Assurance that the Greek government will not intervene in Albania.
  - (e) Confirmation that the coup is currently in accordance with United States policy.

As will appear in references "d" above, the British have initiated a project, which although primarily designed to eliminate conditions along the Albanian-Greek border which are presently conducive to sustained guerrilla action in Greece, is also in consonance with the instant United States project. It is understood that as the United States project is developed, the British will also make complementary expansion of their operations. Coordination with the British is to be achieved through establishment of joint policy center in Washington and a combined command channel for the field.

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c. Conclusion

As the result of negotiations presently underway, it is expected that the political phase will be fully operative and the first preliminary objective accomplished by about 1 July 1949. The time required for accomplishment of the second, third, and fourth preliminary objectives will depend to a great degree on the intensity and effectiveness of the propaganda phase, which should be instituted as soon as possible, as well as the ability of the nominal representatives of the Committee to marshall their people and effectively employ the material support furnished. The propaganda phase will continue throughout the Organization and Training phase, increasing in intensity and reaching its peak with the coup d'etat. The entire project should not exceed a maximum of fifteen (15) months or fall short of a minimum of six (6) months. References "b" through "e" inclusive contain policies, prerequisites, safeguards, and qualifications incident to the premises.

*Integral parts of this plan.* → //

d. Recommendation

It is recommended that the project as outlined "a" and "b" above be adopted and fully implemented as soon as practicable.

3. Operational Control

- a. This project is to be completely controlled by Headquarters, Washington, D. C. through instructions to the Operational Chief in the Field.
- b. Control in the Field will be exercised by the Operational Chief, [ ] with policy guidance from [ ] (whose functions are set forth in Project JBEDICT (No. 9B-5)), and with the advice of [ ]

4. Area of Operation

Physical operations under this project will cover a wide area, including at least, Albania, Greece, Italy, Turkey, the Levant, Egypt, North Africa, Malta and France.

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5. Cover

**Preliminary Objectives:**

Because of the exploratory nature of the initial phases of this project, specific cover arrangements and requirements will be determined in the course of reconnaissance activities conducted by the Operational Chief in the Field. In accordance with a standard operational procedure all cover factors arising in the development of operations will be reviewed by Washington Headquarters.

Refer paragraph 2-a(2)(a). Although the Operational Chief in the Field will seek to cover the extent of United States interest in the activities of the Albanian National Committee, it is not desirable to cover the fact. Instead, emphasis is placed on the reliability and security of Committee members.

Cover considerations for the support of the Committee and of those objectives listed under 2-a(2)(a)(b)(c) and (d) will be recommended from the field to Washington Headquarters for approval.

**Personnel:**

a. The Operational Chief in the Field will have

[He is on leave status, at his request, in order to write a book and at his discretion to furnish special articles to his regular employers. He will be prepared to supply proof of such activities and will maintain contact with those field offices of his regular employer located in the areas in which he will operate. Cover for other U.S. field personnel will be determined in accordance with the principles enunciated under "Preliminary Objectives" above.]

- b. No services required of cover group other than confirmation of status in event of questioning.
- c. Cover is set as in paragraph a. Proposed financial arrangement requires no cover because of status.

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- d. No security action is required to investigate cover.
- e. No documentation to be prepared by Headquarters for cover
- f. Documentation for cover will be prepared in the field as required and with Washington Headquarters approval.

6. Staff

- a. Operations Officer - [ ]
- b. Plans Officer - [ ]
- c. Recommended approving Officer - [ ]
- d. Principal Agent responsible for action [ ] who will act in the status of a covert contractual agent.
- e. Principal Agent's staff to include at least an executive, training officer, communications officer, finance officer and other officers and clerical staff as required. Exact determination of staff depends on current reconnaissance.
- f. Approximately twenty (20) indigenous and United States agents, primarily for training purposes, will be required.
- g. Approximately fifty (50) indigenous employees will be required for duties as chauffeurs, sailors, messengers, etc.

7. Support to be furnished by Headquarters

- a. Special equipment
  - (1) Thirty (30) cameras
  - (2) Twenty-five (25) W/T sets and generating equipment, 1 medium-wave transmitter for propaganda broadcasts.

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- b. No vehicles, exchange commodities, supplies, operational housing or training needed at the present from Headquarters.
- c. Five thousand (5,000) gold sovereigns, five thousand (5,000) gold napoleons to be delivered in Rome. Authority to draw in dollars and local currency from OSO stations at [redacted]
- d. Transportation for [redacted], his family and effects to Athens, Greece, and transportation of personnel subsequently assigned to project from Continental United States, not expected to exceed thirty (30).
- e. Additional support will be required from Headquarters, the exact nature of which cannot be determined, but the quantities and value of which will be relatively small.

**8. Support to be furnished in Field**

- a. It is anticipated that the bulk of equipment for this project, except as noted, will be purchased in the field. This will include weapons, which must be thus procured for cover purposes. The project also entails the hire or purchase of light shipping and aircraft. In the case of aircraft and shipping special precautions will be observed with reference to procurement and operation to the end that cover may be maintained.

**9. Support to be furnished outside CIA**

- a. Equipment presently available in Greece to United States Agencies will be utilized wherever possible by having it loaned or transferred to OPC. Negotiations are presently under way to obtain the following from the ECA Mission:

- (1) One Buick Station Wagon
- (2) Two jeeps and trailers
- (3) One 3/4 ton truck
- (4) One aircraft

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10. Coordination

a. Other agencies

- (1) State--Policy guidance
- (2) National Military Establishment--Support personnel and liaison
- (3) No ether

b. Within CIA

- (1) OSO--Finance, communications and counter espionage
- (2) OO--None

c. Overseas

- (1) OSO Field Officer--Finance support and communications
- (2) U.S. Embassy, Greece--Liaison
- (3) JUSMAG--Liaison

11. Reports

The Operational Chief in the Field will render those progress reports necessary to keep Headquarters Washington, D. C., fully briefed on all pertinent developments.

12. Disaster Plans

To be determined by Operational Chief in the Field in the light of existing conditions and developments.

13. Budget Estimate

The magnitude and significance of this project are believed to justify an allocation of [ ] during Fiscal Year 1950, all of which should be made available during the first six months. See attached Form 404. If the project should

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endure beyond 30 June 1950, additional funds may be required. If it continues beyond 31 December 1950 additional funds will be required.

14. Current Status

a. [The Operational Chief for this project, [ ] has been chosen, has been briefed and departed for the area 10 June 1949. Enroute to the area, he will stop off in London for operational conferences with the British. Commitments have been received from enough prospective members of the Albanian National Committee to ensure the initiation of the political phase 2-b(1). Negotiations are underway for obtaining additional U.S. personnel for this project as needed. Total specific personnel requirements for the project cannot be determined until the receipt of preliminary reports from the Operational Chief following his arrival in the field.

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BUDGET ESTIMATE - PROJECT BGFIEND CODE 1B-10

The data herein must be explained by the information in Par. 5-8 of the Project Outline.  
Check with MBO for assistance

Section I. Confidential Funds Required from CIA

FY <del>1949</del> 1949			FY <del>1950</del> 1950				
(a)	(b) 1st Half	(c) 2nd Half	(d) Total	(e) 1st Half	(f) 2nd Half	(g) Total	(h) Total
1 Personnel		1,500.00		125,000.00			
2 Supplies				100,000.00			
3 Equipment				500,000.00			
4 Subsidies				C 7			
5 Transp'tion		C 7		C 7			
6							
7							
8 Contingencies		C 7		C 7			
9							
10 TOTAL		C 7 C 7 C 7 C 7		C 7			

INSTRUCTIONS: Lines 6-9, Column 1: Indicate other types of expense not listed in lines 1-5 incl.

Columns (b) (c) (e) and (f): Show estimated costs for period.

Columns (d) (g) and (h): Column (h) is total of columns (d) and (g).

Line 10: List sum of figures for each column

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BUDGET ESTIMATE - PROJECT BGFRIEND CODE 1B-10

Section II. Source of Funds within OPC

(a) Source	(b) Amount	(c) Source	(d) Amount
1 Program Group I (1950)	\$895,000.00	Foreign Area Group	
2 Budgetary Group X (1949)	\$ 5,000.00		
3 TOTAL			

INSTRUCTIONS: The figure in line 3, column (d) is the sum of columns (b) and (d) and should correspond to the figure in line 10, column (h) of Section I.

Section III. Resources from outside CIA-non reimbursable-Details should be explained in Par. 9 of Project Outline

(a) Item Required	(b) Amount	(c) Source	(d) Method of Transfer
1 Funds	<u>Not presently known</u>		
2 Personnel			
3 Supplies			
4			
5			
6			
7 TOTAL			

INSTRUCTIONS: Lines 4, 5 and 6, Column (a): List other items not listed in lines 1-3 incl.

Column (b): List amounts of funds and approximate value of other items.

Column (c): List source, e.g., State Dept., NME, etc.

Line 7: List sum of Column (b).

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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE FOR CPC FORM NO. 404.

1. The estimates given on Page 1 of Form 404 for Project BGFIELD are, with the exception of the Personnel item, unsupported by specific calculations as to the actual amount of Supplies, Equipment, Subsidies and Transportation which will be required. It has proved impossible at the present stage of this project to calculate with certainty the future requirements. Under Equipment, for example, it is known that weapons and ammunition will be required. In the absence of precise information as to current conditions in the target area, it is impossible to calculate the quantities which will be required, and, in view of the security restrictions involved, the origin and hence the cost of such equipment.

2. Accordingly, these estimates have been made, on the basis of the best information available at the present time, for only the first six months of the fiscal year 1950, it being reasonably certain that by the end of that period the project will have developed to a stage which will permit reasonably accurate estimates of future expenditures.

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